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I. INTRODUCTION
( ongress has indicated that it intends to give the Department
of Transportation's Associate Administrator for Commercial
Space Transportation (AST or the Office) the authority to regu-
late and license both the launch and re-entry of commercial
space launch vehicles. Currently, the Office has the authority to
regulate and license only the launch portion of a commercial
space launch. The Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs) that
REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES
AST currently has the authority to license are not designed to
survive re-entry. Because the Office will soon have to regulate
new Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLVs) that are designed to be
reused many times by surviving both the launch and re-entry
portions of space flight, the Office needs the authority to license
the re-entry portion of flight.
The Office intends to provide the commercial space launch
industry with standardized licensing regulations and financial
responsibility requirements for commercial space launches.'
Regulations that govern commercial space launch licensing and
financial responsibility requirements are primarily driven by a
risk-based analysis of space launch vehicle safety. The introduc-
tion of RLVs into the commercial space launch industry will fun-
damentally change how commercial space launch companies
and AST regulators approach the licensing and financial re-
sponsibility requirements because the results of the risk-based
analysis that underlies these requirements will change as RLVs
expand the bounds of traditional rocket launch operations.
The risk associated with the operation of a RLV has the poten-
tial to be much higher than the risk associated with that of an
ELV, because a RLV, unlike an ELV, is designed to survive re-
entry and return to a particular re-entry site. The reusability of
RLVs will also encourage private launch companies to launch
RLVs on launch azimuths and trajectories that could pose
greater financial, safety, and national security risks to the United
States government.
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss the potential im-
pact that RLVs will have on the risk-based analysis that is the
foundation for the safety and financial responsibility require-
ments of a commercial launch license. By examining the poten-
tial change in the risk analysis outcome, the federal government
and the space launch industry can predict what changes will, or
should, be made to commercial space transportation licensing
regulations in anticipation of the advent of RLVs.
The federal government regulates commercial space launches
to protect the safety of its citizens, uphold its obligations to en-
sure national security, and promote a thriving commercial space
industry. Instead of examining the language of these regula-
tions, this Comment will investigate the intent behind the regu-
See Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg.
13,216, 13,217 (1997) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 401, 411,413, 415 and 417)
(proposed Mar. 19, 1997) [hereinafter Licensing Regulations].
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lations that could apply to RLVs. This intent will be investigated
through a risk-based analysis of the safety restrictions and finan-
cial responsibilities associated with licensed commercial RLV
operations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. OUTER SPACE TREATY AND THE INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY
CONVENTION
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies 2 and the Convention on the Interna-
tional Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects' provide
the foundation for United States regulation of the domestic
space launch industry. These treaties provide that the United
States assumes global responsibility for national activities con-
ducted in outer space, whether such activities are carried out by
governmental agencies like National Aeronautical and Space
Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense (DOD)
or by non-governmental entities such as private corporations.'
The Liability Convention states that a launching State is given
absolute liability for damage caused to the surface of the earth
or to aircraft in flight by the launch States' space objects.5
If a United States corporation launches a rocket and the
United States is considered the launch state for this rocket, then
the U.S. government will be absolutely liable for all damage
caused by this rocket. A launching State is defined as: (1) a
State that launches or procures the launching of a space object;
or (2) a State from whose territory or facility a space object is
launched.' This means that the United States government is ab-
solutely liable for damage to the surface of the earth and to air-
2 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for
signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct.
10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
3 Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-
jects, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [herein-
after Liability Convention].
4 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, arts. VI and VII, 18 U.S.T. at 2415, 610
U.N.T.S. at 209.
5 See Liability Convention, supra note 3, art. II, 24 U.S.T. at 2392, 951 U.N.T.S.
at 189.




craft caused by United States private corporations that procure
and launch rockets in the global commercial market.
The Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention en-
courage the United States government to regulate its private
space launch companies. If the federal government did not
closely regulate the commercial space launch industry, potential
accidents by this industry could subject the United States to in-
ternational hostility and unlimited financial liability.
B. COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACT OF 1984
The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 established
United States government support for the development of com-
mercial launch vehicles and associated launch services by the
private sector.7 This act also established that private sector
launches had to be authorized by a license issued by the Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT)."
This act was revolutionary in 1984 because only NASA, with its
Space Shuttle, and the Department of Defense, with its ELVs,
were willing to launch payloads9 into space. Before the Act, reg-
ulatory difficulties in obtaining the necessary approvals to con-
duct a commercial launch were so severe that private companies
did not want to enter the satellite launch services market.10 The
Commercial Space Launch Act provided a licensing authority to
oversee launches by the commercial space launch industry and
designated a government agency to regulate this new industry.
C. THE ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE
TRANSPORTATION
The AST, within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
carries out the responsibilities of the Secretary of Transporta-
tion in licensing and regulating commercial space launches. 1I
In April of 1988, AST first published DOT's Commercial Space
7 See Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055,
(1984) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101-301 (1994)) [hereinafter the
Commercial Space Launch Act].
8 See id. at 98 Stat. 3057-58.
9 A payload is an object launched into space by a launch vehicle that includes
subcomponents specifically adapted to that object. See 14 C.F.R. § 401.5.
10 See Interview with Ms. Esta Rosenberg, Attorney-Advisor, Regulations Divi-
sion, Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration (Sept. 1997).
11 There is a delegation in 14 C.F.R. Chapter III from the Secretary of DOT to
the FAA and then 14 C.F.R. Chapter III further delegates authority from the FAA
to AST.
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Transportation Regulations, 12 and in June of 1988 AST issued its
first commercial space license.13
III. THE NEW REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
A. INTRODUCTION TO SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES
The world entered the Space Age in 1957 when The Soviet
Union launched and orbited the first man-made satellite, Sput-
nik, on top of a space launch vehicle (SLV) that was a modified
intercontinental range ballistic missile (ICBM). Over the last
four decades, the former Soviet Union, the United States, and
other nations have achieved space flight primarily by relying on
technology adapted from military ICBMs.
Military ICBMs were designed during the Cold War to deliver
a nuclear payload to a distant target. An ICBM is only intended
to be used once; hence, expendability was emphasized to im-
prove efficiency. Space launch technology was developed from
the ICBM because the cost of developing SLVs otherwise could
have easily cost billions of dollars. All SLVs, except for the
United States and Soviet Space Shuttles, have been developed
from the extensive technology base provided by ICBMs.
The ELV is the only type of SLV used in the global and U.S.
commercial space launch industries. The ELV is a direct de-
scendant of the military ICBM, and it is designed to be used for
only one flight. One of the reasons why space flight is so expen-
sive is because of the one flight design philosophy of ELVs.
An ELV, similar to an ICBM, will typically achieve orbit by sep-
arating into stages. Stage separation is used to make a rocket
lighter as it increases in altitude and velocity by separating large
portions of that rocket. The separated stages of the rocket fall
back to the earth when they are no longer needed to achieve
orbit. Most ELVs are launched over water or sparsely populated
terrain because their self-terminating design and separating
stages make them dangerous to people and property below their
flight path.
12 See 14 C.F.R. pt. 400 (1998).
13 See Financial Responsibility Requirements for Licensed Launch Activities, 61
Fed. Reg. 38,992-93 (1996) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 440) (proposed July




B. THE REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE
A Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) is different from an ELV,
because an ELV is destroyed in the launch process while a RLV
survives launch and re-entry to be used again. A RLV provides
tremendous cost benefits over a comparable ELV, because a
RLV can, with repeated use, recover the huge sunk costs in-
volved in building the launch vehicle. If RLVs are operated re-
peatedly and regularly like aircraft then their operating costs
will eventually be lower than those of ELVs. In order to obtain
aircraft-like RLVs, operators will probably lobby the United
States government for a regulatory environment that lessens the
current safety and operational restrictions currently placed on
ELVs and aircraft.
RLVs hold the potential to reduce space launch costs from
over $10,000 per pound to orbit to under $1000 per pound to
orbit. This reduction in launch costs would allow the United
States space launch industry to dominate the global multi-billion
dollar satellite launch services market. At present, the Euro-
pean Arianespace consortium dominates the geostationary earth
orbit (GEO) portion of this market. 4
Cheaper access to space through RLVs has the potential to
give the space and satellite industry the same exponential
growth that the microprocessor has given the personal com-
puter and software industries. Tens of thousands of new high-
paying jobs in the space industry could be created when new
companies take advantage of the ability to launch payloads into
orbit for millions of dollars per launch instead of tens or hun-
dreds of millions of dollars per launch. Advances in technology
that have encouraged RLV development would allow the United
States to lead the economic revolution in space just as it has led
the economic revolution in information technology.
The new technologies that enable the development of RLVs
are lighter thermal protection systems (TPS), lighter than alumi-
num composite building materials, higher efficiency liquid
rocket engines, and guidance and control (G&C) systems utiliz-
ing satellite navigation updates. New TPSs will allow RLVs to
survive the high temperatures of re-entry that result from fric-
tion between the atmosphere and the rocket body. Lighter
composite building materials will yield lighter weight cryogenic
14 Most companies developing RLVs desire to capture the low earth orbit
(LEO) launch market. Lockheed Martin, with its Venture Star RLV design, in-
tends to compete with Arianspace in the heavy lift GEO launch services market.
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fuel tanks and lighter rocket bodies, allowing rocket designers
to reduce or eliminate the separating stages that make ELVs so
complex and expensive. Higher efficiency rocket engines allow
RLVs to decrease their fueled weight and increase their payload
capacity. New and cheaper guidance systems based on the
Global Positioning Satellite System (GPS) allow RLV designers
to accurately track and steer their vehicles while the rocket is
out of sight or is reentering the atmosphere.
These technologies have reached the appropriate levels of
maturity in the 1990s to make the private development of RLVs
possible. The RLVs developed from these technologies will
present regulatory challenges to the federal government, but, as
mentioned previously, the arrival of RLVs into the commercial
space launch market will hold benefits to the U.S. that greatly
outweigh the difficulty of adapting the present regulatory
environment.
C. STATUS OF REGULATION FOR REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES
AST currently has the authority to license and regulate the
launch portion of a commercial space launch. The Office must
wait for the authority to regulate or license orbiting objects or
de-orbiting re-entry vehicles. 5 Congress must amend the appro-
priate sections within the Commercial Space Launch Act 16 for
the Office to gain the authority to regulate both launches and
re-entries. If the Office does not receive additional authority to
license and regulate space vehicle re-entries, then the new com-
mercial RLVs may not be licensed to fly.
Two new bills in Congress, H.R. 170217 and H.R. 1275,8 in-
tend to give the Office the additional authority it needs to regu-
late and license re-entering space vehicles. Both bills are written
to amend the Commercial Space Launch Act 9 by replacing the
word "launch" with "launch or re-entry" throughout the Act.
Both bills also give the Office six months from the date of enact-
15 The Office is part of the executive branch of government, which means that
it can not make any changes to the law as established in the Commercial Space
Transportation Licensing Regulations. Only the legislative branch of govern-
ment can enact or amend laws. Therefore, it is up to Congress to expand AST's
mandate.
16 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101-19 (1994).
17 Commercial Space Launch Act of 1997, H.R. 1702, 105th Cong.
N H.R. 1275, 105th Cong. (1997) (contains some of the same material covered
in H.R. 1702, except H.R. 1275 is an appropriations bill and H.R. 1702 is not).
19 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101-19 (1994).
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ment to issue new regulations concerning licensing and finan-
cial responsibility requirements for commercial SLVs. 20
If one of these bills is passed, the Office will receive its man-
date to license and regulate re-entry of RLVs, and issue financial
responsibility requirements. The Office would accomplish this
by eventually rewriting the Notices of Proposed Rule Making for
Commercial Space Transportation Regulations and Financial
Responsibility Requirements for Licensed Launch Activities.21
In order to accommodate the arrival of RLVs, the Office will
have to amend these regulations with more thought and effort
than simply replacing the word "launch" with "launch or re-
entry."
IV. CONDITIONS OF A LAUNCH LICENSE
A. AGGREGATE REQUIREMENTS FOR A LAUNCii LICENSE
The Office has limited experience regulating and licensing
RLVs. 22 As the Office gains experience with RLV operations
over the next few years, it will be able to refine its licensing regu-
lations that have been written for ELVs.23
In order to obtain a commercial launch license from the Of-
fice, a United States launch provider must satisfy launch license
and financial responsibility requirements. 2' A launch provider
20 See H.R. 1275, 105th Cong. § 301(c)(1) (1997).
21 Actually, the regulations within 14 C.F.R. ch. III will have to be modified.
22 Reusable Launch Vehicles are currently being developed, so AST has little
experience in regulating RLVs. Regulating the METEOR re-entry vehicle (which
will be discussed later) provided AST with some experience that could be applied
to RLVs.
23 The Office currently utilizes a case-by-case approach to licensing launch op-
erations because of the unique aspects of the various launch proposals submitted.
"Adapting" licensing regulations refers to adapting the regulations in the Notices
of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM). The NPRMs are not official law, but serve as
guidelines for AST and the rocket industry as to how AST will judge a particular
launch proposal. Currently, the NPRM is the only basis for companies to esti-
mate how AST will evaluate certain portions of their launch proposals. This Arti-
cle seeks to discuss adapting the regulations within the NPRMs because a paper
discussing the adaptation of AST's methods of making a case-by-case evaluation
of particular launch proposals would be unclear and tedious.
24 These requirements are respectively described in the NPRM for Commercial
Space Transportation Licensing Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 415, and the NPRM for
Financial Responsibility Requirements for Licensed Launch Activities, 14 C.F.R.
§ 440. The NPRMs are not law until they officially replace the regulations in 14
C.F.R. ch. III, but serve as guidelines for what AST intends to do. One can almost
view the updated regulations within a NPRM as law because AST has already re-
ceived the authority from Congress to make these changes to the law. The
NPRM is just a way for AST to involve industry and the public in designing the
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with a RLV will have to pass a policy review, a payload review, a
safety review, and financial responsibility requirements es-
poused for ELVs in order to meet the conditions for a launch
license.
B. POLICY REVIEW
The Office establishes a policy review for the license applica-
tion which addresses issues that may affect United States na-
tional security or foreign policy interests.25 The policy review
focuses on the proposed mission including foreign ownership,
technology transfer, and other issues that are handled primarily
by other federal agencies like the Department of State and the
Department of Defense. Although many of the issues addressed
in the policy review are of concern to potential RLV operators,
the policy review should not present operators with RLV specific
problems.
The results of a policy review should be the same whether a
launch operator uses a RLV or an ELV. The unique technologi-
cal and operational characteristics of RLVs would notjeopardize
United States national security, foreign policy, or international
obligation interests to a greater than ELVs do. Possible scena-
rios in which a RLV could jeopardize national security, foreign
policy, or international obligations apply to ELVs as well.26 The
present regulations describing the policy review may eventually
be rewritten, but they will not be rewritten to specifically address
the regulatory challenges caused by the new technology found
in RLVs.27
most efficient regulations to implement laws and policies that Congress has al-
ready evoked. This Comment will assume that the NPRMs obtained from AST's
world wide web site in July of 1997 represent what AST wants the commercial
space launch industry to follow in July of 1997.
25 See 14 C.F.R. § 415.23
26 As an example, Kistler Aerospace Corporation wants to launch its K-i RLV
from Australia. This is not a problem for the policy review that is unique to
RLVs, because a U.S. company could request to launch an ELV from Australia. If
Kistler wanted to launch from Australia and land in the U.S., problems for the
policy review may result due to the unique characteristics of a RLV. Such scena-
rios, though, are better discussed in an academic paper that desires to stretch the
limits of the possible legal ramifications of RLV operation. This Comment will
not address this topic.
Military application of RLVs will present problems in the future for U.S. obliga-
tions under international treaties. Military uses of RLVs will not be addressed
herein as this Comment focuses on commercial uses of RLVs.
27 The Office handles situations not addressed in the regulations in the




The Office uses a payload review to determine if the license
applicant or payload operator has obtained all the required
licenses, authorizations, and permits needed to carry a payload
into space.28 The payload review is designed to ensure that the
launch services provider has registered the payload with the ap-
propriate federal agency and to ensure that the payload is safe
enough to be launched into space.
Nothing in the payload review would have to be changed spe-
cifically for RLV operations. Any payload that could be flown in
the future on a RLV could also be flown at present on an ELV.
The present regulations describing the payload review may even-
tually be rewritten, but they will not need to be rewritten specifi-
cally to address the regulatory challenges resulting from the new
technology found in RLVs.
D. SAFETry REVIEW
The Office uses a safety review to determine whether a launch
license applicant is capable of launching a vehicle and its
payload without jeopardizing the safety of people or property.29
Most of the safety review regulations could be used to review the
safety of a RLV as adequately as they review the safety of an ELV.
Regulations calling for safety organization, launch safety design
and operation, a communications plan, and an accident investi-
gation plan would not have to change significantly for RLV op-
erations. 30 Substituting the words "launch or re-entry" for
"launch" in the aforementioned regulations, these would most
likely make adequate the regulations for RLV operations.
The only safety regulation that would probably change signifi-
cantly with the advent of RLV operations is the regulation evalu-
ating acceptable flight risk through orbital insertion. 3'
Acceptable flight risk is calculated using a risk-based analysis.
The acceptable flight risk of a RLV could be significantly higher
than that of an ELV because risk calculation would include both
launch and re-entry instead of launch alone. The unique tech-
nological and operational characteristics of a RLV, as compared
to that of an ELV, will change the results of the acceptable flight
risk calculations. This change will result in RLV operators and
28 See Licensing Regulations, supra note 1.
29 See id. at 13,242.
30 See id. at 13,242-43.
31 See id. at 13,242.
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AST regulators reevaluating how they balance risk with perform-
ance in rocket vehicle design, operation, and regulation.
E. FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
A launch services provider must meet financial responsibility
requirements that are calculated by the Office." The Office
provides space launch companies with two maximum probable
loss (MPL) determinations which provide the amount of third
party liability and government property insurance that the
launch provider must maintain.3 3 These MPLs are calculated us-
ing a risk-based analysis.
The MPLs calculated from a risk-based analysis of RLV opera-
tions could be different than the MPLs calculated for ELV oper-
ations because of the technological and operational uniqueness
of RLVs.3 ' This may force RLV operators to maintain insurance
that was not anticipated in their original business plans or oper-
ational budgets. The potential change in the results of the risk-
based analysis used to calculate the MPL may change the way
that RLV operators and AST regulators view the impact of the
financial responsibility regulations.
V. RISK-BASED ANALYSIS OF RLV OPERATIONS
A. CHANGES IN THE RESULTS OF THE RISK-BASED CALCULATION
MUST BE ADVERTISED
This Article previously discerned in Section IV that the condi-
tions for obtaining a launch license that may change signifi-
cantly for RLV operators are the conditions for financial
responsibility and safety. Specifically, the risk-based analysis that
underlies the acceptable flight risk calculation in the safety re-
view and the maximum probable loss calculation in the financial
responsibility requirements could produce higher results for a
RLV than those calculated for a comparable ELV perform-
ance.35 If one could estimate the risk involved in operating a
32 See 49 U.S.C. § 70112(a) (1994).
33 See 49 U.S.C. § 70112(a) (3) (1994).
34 The MPLs would be calculated the same way, but the inputs to the calcula-
tion would change, which would probably change the end result. Also, because
risk calculation of vehicle re-entry must be added, it is difficult to imagine that
the MPL could remain the same.
35 The way this risk is calculated and the results of this calculation may remain
the same, but the inputs to both risk-based determinations will change. This
change to the inputs could result in higher acceptable flight risk or maximum
probable loss if something is not done by RLV operators or AST regulators.
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RLV, then AST regulators and potential RLV operators could
anticipate and alleviate potential obstacles to commercial RLV
flight before they arise.
Arguably, the two most important questions that commercial
launch license applicants ask the Office and themselves are if
the operation of their particular launch vehicle is safe and what
level of liability insurance they will have to maintain. If a com-
mercial launch is not considered to be safe or insurable, then
the regulations that are associated with launch safety and insura-
bility should warn potential launch applicants of this situation.
In order for this to happen, any change in the results of the risk-
based analysis underlying both launch vehicle safety and finan-
cial responsibility must be advertised and addressed. Potential
RLV operators need to know, before they apply for a launch
license, that a RLV's unique technical and operational charac-
teristics compared to an ELV will change the inputs and results
of these risk-based calculations.
B. CALCULATING THE LAUNCH PORTION OF RLV SAFETY RISK
1. Total Casualty Expectation
The acceptable flight risk of a commercial launch vehicle is
calculated through orbital insertion. 6 In order to obtain safety
approval, the risk level associated with an applicant's launch
proposal can not exceed a collective risk of thirty casualties in
one million launches (E,a1<= 30 x 106). 37 The quantity Etotal is
the total casualty expectation, and it corresponds to the ex-
pected mean number of casualties or injuries that would occur if
an ELV is launched according to a specific mission plan.3 8 The
quantity E is defined as the casualty expectation, which is the
mean number of casualties over a subset area, A.
In general E is obtained by considering the following
quantities:
1) a subset of an area, A, over which possible debris impact
could occur;
2) the fragment impact probability, P, on A produced by a
given launch vehicle failure;
3) the effective hazard area, H, for an impacting piece of deb-
ris within A; and
Performance here is defined as payload mass to orbit.
36 See Licensing Regulations, supra note 1, at 13,242.
37 See id.
38 See id. at 13,320.
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4) the number of people, N, within A that are at risk from
debris impacts. 9
These quantities are then used in the equation E = (P*H*N)/A
to determine what the estimated casualty is for a subset of the
area over which the rocket is launched. The total casualty expec-
tation, Eoiai, is determined by summing the E's from all the sub-
set areas the launch vehicle could affect.40
If total casualty expectation, E",o0 , were calculated for the
launch portion of a RLV flight, the results would probably be
different than the results of a similar calculation for an ELV.
The technical and operational uniqueness of an RLV would re-
sult in different inputs being placed into the casualty expecta-
tion equation of E = (P*H*N)/A, which would result in a
different E. In addition, the number of subset areas over which
EoLaI is calculated would increase, affecting the output of the to-
tal casualty expectation.4 A discussion of unique operational
and technical characteristics of RLVs affecting the inputs to the
acceptable flight risk calculations follows.
2. Changes to Eoal Caused by a RLV's Thermal Protection System
It was discussed previously in Section III that a RLV must use a
thermal protection system (TPS) in order to prevent disintegra-
tion upon vehicle re-entry. If a RLV blows up during the launch
portion of flight, the debris caused by this explosion would
probably not disintegrate as easily as the debris caused by a simi-
lar ELV failure.42 The heat of a rocket explosion and the ensu-
ing heat of debris re-entry would usually cause the debris from
an ELV to break into smaller pieces as it approaches the
ground. A RLV failure would most likely cause larger and more
39 See Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Associate Administrator
for Commercial Space Transportation, Hazard Analysis of Commercial Space Trans-
portation 9-8 to 9-9 (visited Oct. 26, 1998) <http://ast.faa.gov/reports>.
40 See id. at 9-9.
41 These E,,,o, calculations only affect the launch portion of acceptable flight
safety risk calculations. The re-entry portion of these calculations will be handled
later in this paper. See infra Part IV.B.3.
42 Most rocket explosions during ELV launches occur when the flight termina-
tion system (FTS) is activated. Many RLV companies intend to build RLVs with-
out FTS (Pioneer Rocket Plane has a man in the loop in their proposal, hence an
FTS could be out of the question), because they feel the design of their RLVs will
allow for non-destructive aborts. If a RLV has a FFS then its failure mode can be
compared effectively to that of an ELV. If a RLV does not have a FTS, then the
risk that there will be an explosion would probably decrease while the casualties
from a catastrophic failure would probably increase (because you could have a
near intact rocket impacting the surface).
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lethal pieces of debris because the TPS would resist the heat of
the rocket explosion and further disintegration. The larger
debris from a RLV failure would also have a higher coefficient of
lift which would help this debris to "fly" and disperse over a
broader area than debris from a similar ELV failure.
The effective hazard or casualty area, H, would probably in-
crease significantly for a RLV compared to an ELV because the
number of debris particles in the RLV's fragmentation pattern
would increase and each piece of debris would be of greater size
and lethality. The total number of subset areas that the total
casualty expectation would have to be calculated over would also
probably increase because the "flying" debris mentioned above
would be able to cover a wider swath."3 These changes to the
inputs of the total casualty expectation equation caused by the
TPS of the RLV would greatly increase Eoa.
3. Changes to Eoai Caused by Unique RLV Operations
Potential RLV operators intend to operate their launch vehi-
cles in ways that are considered risky today. Some of these po-
tential RLV operators intend to launch their two stage to orbit
(TSTO) and single stage to orbit (SSTO) RLVs from launch
sites in Nevada and New Mexico that are surrounded by land.
They intend to launch their RLVs into due east and polar orbits
that would take them over land and populated areas. For RLV
companies like Kistler Aerospace Corporation, which intend to
design and operate TSTO RLVs, launching over land may be the
only option because recovery of the reusable first stage would be
difficult if it were launched over the ocean. 44
If RLV operators do launch their vehicles over land and popu-
lated areas then the number of people, N, within the subset ar-
eas would probably increase dramatically. The increase in the
input, N, to the casualty expectation equation, E = (P*H*N)/A,
would increase E (which would also cause an increase to Etogat).
43 In easier to understand terms, there will be a larger and more lethal frag-
mentation pattern caused by a RLV explosive failure compared to a similar ELV
failure. If you filled an exploding artillery shell with paper instead of shrapnel,
the paper would disintegrate upon explosion more easily and it would not wound
as many soldiers as the metal shrapnel. It may help to look at the TPS on a RLV
like shrapnel in an artillery shell. This is an extremely crude comparison, but it
may help.
44 Kistler Aerospace Corporation intends to fly their first stage back to the
launch area, but this can be a difficult task for a ballistic vehicle with limited lift
and cross range capability.
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4. Conclusion of Launch Portion of RL V Safety Risk
When total casualty expectation is calculated for the launch
portion of a RLV flight, the inputs of hazard area (H), the
number of people within a possible impact area (A), and the
number of subset areas all increase. This means that Etotai, the
total casualty expectation, could greatly increase for RLVs.45
The only thing that could keep Eoai from increasing would be
a decrease in the probability density, P, of the launch vehicle.46
If RLVs proved to be more reliable than ELVs, then Eota might
not increase.47 It is unknown if E,, would exceed the thirty casu-
alties in one million launches (Etoti < = 30 * 106) proposed by
the Office,4" but Eo,,, will rise dramatically unless RLV operators
can prove that their launch vehicles have less probability of deb-
ris causing system failures than ELVs.
C. CALCULATING THE RE-ENTRY PORTION OF RLV SAFETY RISK
Recall that the calculation of Etoiai only covers the safety risk
associated with the launch portion of a RLV flight. In order for
a RLV to obtain a license it must also meet safety requirements,
eventually established by AST, for the re-entry portion of flight.
1. The METEOR Re-entry Vehicle System
In 1992 the Office was presented with the responsibility of li-
censing the launch of a commercial re-entry vehicle known as
the Multiple Experiment to Earth Orbit and Return (METEOR)
re-entry vehicle.49 EER Systems Corporation, the operator of
the METEOR, proposed to place the METEOR into orbit and
have it perform an unguided re-entry thirty days later.50 In li-
censing the METEOR, the Office decided that one license
would be issued covering the launch of the METEOR on the
45 Remember that both hazard area (If) and possible impact area () are in
the numerator of the E equation so E,,,., will increase dramatically with in-
creases in H and N.
46 The fragment impact probability, P, produced by a given launch vehicle fail-
ure can be reduced by decreasing the likelihood that a particular failure scenario
will produce impacting fragments. This should not be confused with decreasing
the chance of vehicle failure itself.
47 If a RLV was more reliable than a comparable ELV then the possible failure
scenarios would decrease. One could accomplish this by building the RLV with
higher fault tolerances than a comparable ELV.
48 See Licensing Regulations, supra note 1, at 13,242.
49 See id. Grant of Petition for Waiver of Safety Criterion for METEOR Reentry
Vehicle System, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,476 (1995).
50 See id.
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Conestoga ELV and the re-entry of the METEOR thirty days af-
ter orbital insertion. 1 The launch portion of the license de-
fined the METEOR as a payload, therefore, the safety review of
the ELV launch was the standard review.2 The safety of the
reentering payload was evaluated using three risk-based criteria
which are displayed as follows:
1) The probability of the re-entry vehicle landing outside the
designated landing site could be no greater than 3 in 1000
missions (P <= 3 x 10");
2) The additional risks to the public in the immediate vicinity
(within 100 miles) of the landing site could not exceed the
normal background risks of 1 casualty in a million mis-
sions on an annual basis for a single mission (P <= 1 x 106);
3) The general risks to the general public beyond the 100
mile zone could not exceed the normal background risk
of 1 casualty in a million on an annual basis for a single
mission (P <= 1 x 106) . 53
In determining whether the METEOR met these three crite-
ria, the Office determined that only human-induced or inten-
tional reentries would be analyzed. The Office felt that if the
METEOR did not reenter properly upon command, the rela-
tionship between the vehicle and the vehicle operator would be
broken and the METEOR would be treated as any other mal-
functioning payload. 4
In applying these criteria to the METEOR, the Office deter-
mined that some of the risk calculations could be relaxed or
entirely waved. The criteria that the METEOR have a
probability less than three in one thousand of landing outside of
its designated landing site was eventually waived because the
METEOR's mission was changed to allow it to land in the
ocean.5 5 This risk-based criteria was waived for accurate land-
ings, because there was less likelihood of injuring a person at sea
if the METEOR missed its landing zone.56 The Office stated
51 See Commercial Space Transportation; Evaluation of COMET Reentry Vehi-
cle System, 57 Fed. Reg. 55,021 (1992).
52 See id.
53 See Commercial Space Transportation Evaluation Criteria for Issuance of Ve-
hicle Safety Approval for the COMET Reentry Vehicle System, 57 Fed. Reg.
10,213, 10,215 (1992).
54 See Commercial Space Transportation; Grant of Petition for Waiver of Safety
Criterion for METEOR Reentry Vehicle System, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,476, 39,477
(1995).
55 See id. at 39,478.
56 See id.
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that all three criteria for reentering vehicles could be waived or
relaxed if the re-entry plan warranted such flexibility.5 7
2. Applying METEOR Lessons to RL V Safety Review
The approach the Office took in licensing the launch and re-
covery of the METEOR is a rational way for the Office to license
the launch and re-entry of RLVs. The Office would probably
give one license to a launch applicant that would cover both the
launch and re-entry portions of flight. The Office could evalu-
ate the launch portion of the RLV license using the safety review
criteria it has developed for ELVs, and then evaluate the re-entry
portion of the license using the same criteria it developed for
the METEOR.
The Office could find some trouble in evaluating the re-entry
of RLVs with criteria developed from the re-entry of the ME-
TEOR because the operational and technical characteristics of a
RLV are different from those of the METEOR. Any potential
RLV would be much larger than the METEOR, increasing the
probability of harm if there were a failure. A potential RLV may
also carry significant amounts of cryogenic fuel upon re-entry
that would make the RLV a large fire bomb if it failed upon re-
entry.58 The TSTO RLVs like the Kistler K-1 would have two
different reentering vehicles to evaluate under the risk-based
criteria. Finally, RLV operators that intend to operate their
RLVs inland could have potential debris impact areas that en-
compass large swaths of populated territory.
D. DEVELOPING A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE RLV
SAFETY REVIEW
The Office has the opportunity to use the experience and ex-
pertise gained from conducting safety reviews of ELVs and the
METEOR to assist it in writing regulations governing the safety
review of the launch and re-entry of a RLV.59 For the launch
portion of flight, the Office could evaluate a RLV using the total
casualty expectation calculation that it uses for ELVs. This cal-
culation would quantify the risk associated with launch opera-
tions and could be used to determine if this risk is within the
57 See id. at 39,478-79.
58 A fire bomb in the sense that the fuel would ignite and create a tremendous
explosion.
59 This is of course after legislation in H.R. 1275 and H.R. 1702 is signed into
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acceptable range for a licensed launch (Etot01 <= 30 x 106). For
the re-entry portion of flight, the Office could quantify and eval-
uate risk using the three criteria established in the licensing of
the METEOR re-entry vehicle.6 °
When a potential RLV operator establishes with AST that she
has met (1) the risk-based criteria for the launch portion of
flight and (2) the risk-based criteria for the re-entry portion of
flight, she can receive a license to operate the RLV. Although
the RLV operator may receive one license from AST covering
launch and re-entry, the risk-based analysis behind the launch
safety review and the re-entry safety review should remain sepa-
rate. If these analyses were not kept separate, RLV operators
would be forced to add re-entry risk into their Eo1a1 launch risk
calculations. This would force RLV operators to evaluate the
launch portion of their flight under tougher standards than
comparable ELV operators, 61 a penalty that AST is unlikely to
impose on the new RLV technology.
E. IMPACT OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON RLV LICENSING
AND OPERATIONS
The actual construction of the safety review for RLVs may be
very similar to regulations written in the past, but the results of
the risk based analysis underlying the safety review will change
significantly. AST regulators and potential RLV operators must
recognize that the inputs to the risk calculations will change be-
cause of the unique operational and technical characteristics of
the RLVs. These different inputs will either force the Office to
relax or waive some of its risk-based requirements, or it may
force RLV companies to design or operate RLVs in a safer, less
aggressive manner.
A RLV, unlike an ELV, is not designed to destroy itself during
the launch process. This means that it is likely that RLV design-
ers would build their vehicles with higher fault tolerances, be-
cause they plan on using their rockets repeatedly. If RLV
designers make their vehicles more reliable than comparable
60 Because the Office has not licensed RLV operations at present, it will be
assumed that the Eod calculation, to assess acceptable flight risk at launch, will be
evaluated separately from the three criteria that will determine re-entry safety.
This means that the re-entry portion of risk will not be added into the E 1,,, equa-
tion evaluating launch risk.
61 Any re-entry risk added to launch risk would be subtracted from the total
risk allowed during launch (i.e., E,,, would now have to be'even lower than 30 x
l10). This could force RLV operators to reduce their launch risk.
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ELVs, they will receive corresponding benefits from an AST
safety review. If the probability that RLVs will fail in particular
launch scenarios is reduced in comparison to ELVs operated
under the same launch scenarios, then the value of the total
casualty expectation (Et,,aI) for a given RLV launch could be re-
duced as well. RLV designers need to build rockets that are
more reliable than ELVs.
The easiest way for RLV operators to lower the safety risk of
their vehicles is to operate them in the safest manner possible.
If RLV operators operate their vehicles during launch and re-
entry, over water and sparsely populated terrain, like ELV opera-
tors do today, then they would limit the probability of casualty
from a possible failure. At present, some RLV companies like
Kistler Aerospace feel obligated to launch from inland launch
sites over populated regions of the U.S. or Canada.6 2 These
companies may want to consider choosing traditional launch
sites like Vandenberg AFB for polar orbits and Cape Canaveral
for due east orbits to avoid dangerous flight over populated ter-
ritories." Companies designing ballistic RLVs like Kistler may
also want to consider launching their rockets from off-shore
platforms like the Boeing Sea Launch Venture. By choosing
more conservative launch and recovery strategies, RLV compa-
nies could avoid having to ensure extreme reliability of their
vehicles.
Some RLV concepts, like those of Pioneer Rocket Plane and
Kelly Aerospace Corporation, intend to use a carrier aircraft and
some form of a trans-atmospheric, winged aerospace vehicle to
place a payload into orbit.64 These concepts could mitigate risk
62 Kistler intends to conduct its U.S. launches from Nevada. If Kistler launches
due east from Nevada, their launch path will take them over the middle of the
continental U.S. If Kistler launches into polar orbits (due north), then its flight
path will take it over the width of Canada.
63 Vandenberg AFB and Cape Canaveral are not the only options available to
these RLV companies. Commercial launch sites will soon be available in Alaska,
California, Florida, New Mexico and other places throughout the United States.
These options will provide flexibility when RLV companies determine what site to
use when launching into polar or due east orbits.
64 Pioneer plans to have a manned aerospace vehicle fly from a runway to a
refueling tanker, take on liquid oxygen, use a rocket engine to boost the aero-
space vehicle, an upper stage, and a satellite into space. Upon reaching space,
the aerospace vehicle with pilot will glide back to earth for a runway landing,
while the upper stage ignites and carries the satellite to low earth orbit (LEO).
In the Kelly concept, the unmanned aerospace vehicle is towed to altitude by a
large aircraft, and upon release from the tow plane, the aerospace vehicle ignites
its engine taking the vehicle, an upper stage, and a satellite into space. The up-
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by conducting the majority of their operations over the ocean or
sparsely populated terrain. If they used runways near Vanden-
berg AFB for polar launches and runways on the east coast for
due east launches, most of their launch operation and vehicle
recovery activities would be conducted over the ocean. From
rocket engine ignition to orbital insertion, these RLVs would
have comparable or superior safety to ELVs launched from the
same areas on the same launch azimuths and trajectories.65
VI. RISK-BASED ANALYSIS OF RLV FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
A. RiSK-BASED FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
License applicants must meet third party and government
property financial responsibility requirements in order to re-
ceive a launch license.66 The third party financial responsibility
requirements are designed to insulate the launch participants
against claims made by third parties for bodily injury or property
damage resulting from licensed launch activities. The govern-
ment property financial responsibility requirements are
designed to cover claims for damage to U.S. Government prop-
erty during licensed launch activities.67
The amount of third party liability insurance required by the
Office is determined by the Office's calculation of maximum
probable loss (MPL). Third party liability insurance purchased
by the launch provider should not exceed the lesser of 500 mil-
lion dollars or the maximum liability insurance available on the
world market at a reasonable cost (as determined by the Of-
fice) .68 United States Government property insurance require-
ments are also determined by the Office's calculation of
maximum probable loss (MPL), and these insurance require-
ments should not exceed 100 million dollars.69 In what is fre-
per stage places the satellite into orbit while the aerospace vehicle glides to a
runway landing.
65 They would be safe for the same reason that the Orbital Sciences Pegasus
XL vehicle is safe from rocket ignition to orbital insertion. If the Pegasus XL fails
immediately after launch, it will fail at sea, while a ground launched ELV failing
near the earth would cause damage to the surrounding area. AST's experience
with the Pegasus XL has shown that risk mitigation for launch concepts involving
trans-atmospheric vehicles is manageable.
See Financial Responsibility Requirements for Licensed Launch Activities,
supra note 13.
67 See id.
- See 49 U.S.C. § 70112 (1994).
6 See id.
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quently referred to as "indemnification," the U.S. Government,
subject to an act of appropriation by Congress, may pay third
party claims up to 1.5 billion dollars in excess of the third party
liability coverage payments.7 °
All of these financial responsibility requirements are designed
to promote the commercial space launch industry while protect-
ing the government from liability under the terms of the 1972
Liability Convention. Minimum insurance requirements make
commercial launch companies financially responsible for
launch operations, while indemnification allows these same
companies to operate without the fear of unlimited liability ban-
krupting their companies. Insurance requirements, determined
by the two MPLs, are risk-based, pursuant to the statute. 71 The
government intended for launch providers to purchase financial
responsibility in proportion to the risk that their commercial
launch operations pose to government property and third
parties. 2
B. MPL AND THRESHOLD PROBABILITY
A MPL for third party liability and U.S. government property
insurance is calculated by the Office to determine the financial
responsibility requirements of a commercial launch operator.
The definition of MPL is the maximum magnitude of loss such
that there is less than a threshold probability that losses will ex-
ceed the calculated amount. The threshold probability repre-
sents the probability that loss or damage will exceed the
calculated MPL.73
The Office sets threshold probabilities on the order of 1 in
100,000 (or 105 ) and 1 in 10 million (10-7) in order to calculate
the financial responsibility requirements of government prop-
erty and third party liability losses, respectively.74  When a
launch provider obtains the required government property in-
surance at a level equal to the MPL, the U.S. government should
have less than a 1 in 100,000 chance (the threshold probability)
of having to pay for damages in excess of that MPL. When a




73 See Department of Transportation, Financial Responsibility for Reentry Vehicle





ance at a level equal to the MPL, the launch participants and the
U.S. government should have less than a 1 in 10 million chance
(the threshold probability) of liability for damages in excess of
that MPL. If the threshold probability is low, then the required
insurance coverage, the MPL, will be high. If the threshold
probability is high, then commercial launch providers will pay
less.
The two MPL calculations seek to determine the maximum
government property or third party losses that are reasonably
likely to occur from particular failure scenarios that are within
the threshold probability. As an example, for government prop-
erty insurance, if the probabilities of the loss of a launch tower, a
water tank, and a building accumulate to equal the threshold
probability (10-), then one would add the replacement value of
those buildings in aggregate to obtain the MPL. As an example
of third party liability flight risk, if the probabilities of particular
damage for certain flight failure modes are accumulated to
equal the threshold probability (107), then one would add the
perceived liability costs of each of these probabilities to obtain
the MPL.
The accumulation of probabilities to equal the threshold
probability and the calculation of the MPL are complex proce-
dukes that may involve extensive computer modeling and the
use of human experts. For the purposes of this Article, it is only
important to remember that these calculations are risk based. If
a launch vehicle is launched over New York City, the costs associ-
ated with each probable failure will be very high which will re-
sult in a high MPL. If a launch vehicle is launched over the
ocean, avoiding major shipping lanes, the costs associated with
probable failure will be low, which will result in a low MPL. The
risk-based analysis underlying the financial responsibility re-
quirements is similar to that underlying the safety requirements
in that a commercial launch provider will be penalized for oper-
ations that are considered risky by contemporary rocket launch
standards.
C. CALCULATION OF MPL FOR THE LAUNCH PORTION OF
RLV FLIGHT
The introduction of RLVs into the marketplace will change
the results of the risk-based analysis underlying the financial re-
sponsibility requirements because RLVs are not conventional
rockets. For the launch portion of flight, the introduction of
RLVs may lead to higher costs for third party liability and gov-
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ernment property insurance. The increase in obtaining third
party liability insurance would be caused by the unique techni-
cal and operational characteristics that RLVs possess over ELVs.
Technical or operational characteristics of a RLV that could
adversely affect the Office's safety review of a license applicant
would also increase the value of the third party MPL calcula-
tion.75 As mentioned previously in Section V.B.2. of this Article,
the thermal protection system of a RLV would probably gener-
ate different debris patterns than a comparable ELV. This could
potentially cause more casualties, increasing the likelihood of
third party liability claims. As mentioned in Section V.B.3., the
unique operation of some RLVs over land and populated areas
could increase potential casualties, which would also increase
potential liabilities.
The introduction of RLVs probably will not significantly affect
the MPL calculations for the launch portion of government
property insurance because RLVs and ELVs can damage equip-
ment at government launch sites with equal proficiency. The
planned operation of RLVs from commercial launch sites would
also scrap most government property insurance requirements
because these requirements are primarily designed to handle
the loss of government property from launch operations at a
government owned launch site.
D. CALCULATION OF MPL FOR THE RE-ENTRY PORTION OF RLV
FLIGHT
In a report prepared for the Office in 1995 by Princeton
Synergetics Incorporated (PSI), it was found that the current
statutory requirements used to determine financial responsibil-
ity for licensed launch operations were more than adequate for
use in licensed re-entry operations.76 It was also determined
that the calculation of MPLs and the MPL ceilings for govern-
ment property and third party liability insurance requirements
should remain the same.77 It was also found that the govern-
ment payment of excess claims provision of the Commercial
Space Launch Act should apply to limit the financial risk of
commercial re-entry operations.?
7- If the chances that AST will find something that is "unsafe" increase, then
the value of the MPL is likely to increase as well.
76 See Financial Responsibility, supra note 73, at 32-3.
77 See id. at 34-6.
71 See id. at 35-6.
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Initially, when RLVs first begin commercial operations, it may
be prudent to set MPLs and insurance requirements for re-entry
that are separate from the MPLs for the launch portion of flight.
This should be done because the risk-based analysis used to cal-
culate the MPL would be different for the launch and re-entry
portions of flight.
In order to determine the re-entry insurance requirements
for a RLV, the Office would calculate two MPLs that would de-
termine the maximum government property or third party
losses that are reasonably likely to occur (i.e., within the thresh-
olds). If the probabilities of particular damage caused by cer-
tain- re-entry failure modes are accumulated to equal the
threshold probability (10' or 10-'), then the perceived liability
costs of each of these probabilities could be added to obtain
MPLs. Failure modes could include a RLV producing destruc-
tive impact debris and a RLV crashing outside of its designated
landing zone due to a post-re-entry guidance system malfunc-
tion. Uncontrolled re-entries are not considered in the finan-
cial responsibility analysis just as they are not considered in the
safety review. This is explained in Section V.C. of this Article.
E. DEVELOPING A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR RLV
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
The Office has experience in calculating MPLs for the launch
portion of rocket flight. The Office will most likely support the
policy recommendations of PSI and use the same risk-based
strategy it uses with rocket launches to calculate MPLs for vehi-
cle reentries.79 When RLV companies approach AST to receive
a projection of their financial responsibility requirements for
RLV operations, AST should give these companies four MPLs.
Two of the MPLs would be used to cover government property
and liability insurance for launch operations, and the other two
MPLs would cover government property and liability insurance
for re-entry operations. The risk-based MPL analysis will be sep-
arated between launch and re-entry, because this will allow AST
regulators and RLV operators to evaluate unique launch and re-
entry scenarios with more flexibility.
As an example, a RLV operator may desire to conduct twenty
launches from different locations, but may want each of those
launches to conclude with a re-entry at the same location under
standardized parameters. Under this scenario, the Office could
See id.
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give the RLV operator the same sets of MPLs (i.e., government
property and liability MPLs) for the twenty re-entries, but differ-
ent sets of MPLs to cover each unique launch operation. By sep-
arating the risk-based MPL calculations between launch and re-
entry portions, the Office and RLV operators can better discern
the portions of flight over which risk mitigation may need to
occur. The RLV operator would be obligated to purchase insur-
ance that covered all four MPLs in order to meet the financial
responsibility requirements and receive a license. Government
indemnification against possible claims in excess of the re-entry
MPLs should be provided as it is provided for the launch MPLs.
F. IMPACT OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON RLV FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
There is a possibility that RLV insurance costs will increase
over ELV insurance costs because a RLV should receive four sep-
arate MPLs (as opposed to two for an ELV) to insure the vehicle
over both the launch and re-entry portions of flight. If insur-
ance costs for RLVs are to remain comparable to contemporary
insurance costs for ELVs, either the design or operation of RLVs
has to be superior to that of comparable performance ELVs.
A company launching RLVs over land and then recovering
those RLVs over land must understand that the costs and the
number of failure scenarios used in the calculation of the aggre-
gate MPL have increased. The only way to keep insurance costs
from escalating in line with the costs and number of possible
failure scenarios is to design a RLV that is less likely to fail than a
comparable ELV. If RLVs are designed with the same fault tol-
erances as ELVs, then RLV operators should expect to pay
higher total insurance costs for the combined launch and re-
entry portions of flight. If RLV operators launch and recover
their vehicles in ways that ELVs have avoided, they should not be
surprised by aggregate MPLs that are much higher than those
given to ELV operators. The keys to low RLV insurance liability
are conservative ELV-like operations and vehicle designs that
are more reliable than ELVs.
VII. CONCLUSION
Risk analysis is the technical process for identifying, character-




safety review and financial responsibility requirements on a risk-
based analysis because it needs an objective and technical pro-
cess to evaluate the probability and consequences of undesirable
events happening in licensed launch activities. This evaluation
allows the Office and launch license applicants to answer the
two most fundamental questions concerning the regulation of
commercial space launch vehicles: (i) is the launch vehicle safe
to fly, and (ii) can it be insured at a reasonable price?
The unique technical and operational characteristics of RLVs
compared to ELVs will change the results of the risk-based analy-
sis defining the safety and financial responsibility requirements
for licensed launch activities. The laws that regulate the U.S.
commercial space launch industry will not change dramatically
with the advent of RLVs, but changes in the results of the analy-
sis behind these regulations will change how these laws are ap-
plied to RLVs.
The risk assessment for RLVs will extend from the launch por-
tion of flight to both the launch and re-entry portions of flight.
This extension will cause an increase in the total potential risk
of RLV operations. This potential increase may make RLVs un-
safe to operate or too risky to insure, unless potential RLV oper-
ators take appropriate action before they approach AST for a
license.
The U.S. government, through AST, desires to make its com-
mercial launch industry as safe as possible, because it is obli-
gated by international treaty to do so. The 1967 Outer Space
Treaty makes the U.S. government responsible for all space
launches conducted by U.S. private companies. The 1972 Lia-
bility Convention makes the U.S. government financially respon-
sible for any damage that may occur from private corporation
mishaps. This means that it is unlikely that the government,
through AST, will relax the safety review and financial responsi-
bility requirements for future commercial RLV operations be-
cause those requirements have evolved from international
agreements.
Realism would dictate that the U.S. government's obligations
under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1972 Liability Con-
vention will force AST to'leave the criteria that governs the risk-
based analysis of safety and financial responsibility alone. For
the safety review, this means that maximum total casualty expec-
tation for launch is likely to remain the same, and the three cri-
teria established to evaluate the METEOR re-entry will probably
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not be relaxed if they are applied to RLV safety.8 For financial
responsibility requirements, the threshold probabilities for gov-
ernment property and third party liability insurance will remain
the same, and they will also be applied to a second set of MPL
calculations for the re-entry portion of flight.8 2
It is the duty of RLV operators to build and operate RLVs that
satisfy AST's future licensing requirements. Because the U.S.
government is bound by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the
1972 Liability Convention, no amount of lobbying by potential
RLV operators will relax AST's risk-based criteria. If RLV com-
panies build RLVs that are more robust and reliable than ELVs,
and operate these RLVs in the same safe manner that ELVs have
been operated in the past, then they will have no problem in
obtaining the licenses they need to capture the multi-billion dol-
lar space launch market for the United States.
81 See discussion supra Parts V.B.1.-C.1.
112 See discussion supra Parts VI.B., D.
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